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"EVERYTHING'S A LITTLE UPSIDE DOWN, As
A MATTER OF FACT THE WHEELS HAVE
STOPPED":
THE FRAUDULENCE OF THE INCOMPETENCY
EVALUATION PROCESS
Michael L. Perlin, J.D.
INTRODUCTION
I frequently lecture on questions of criminal incompetencies,'
and, when I do, I am often asked to recommend what I think are the
most "important" articles in the field. I invariably tell the audiences
that there are two articles that stand head and shoulders above all
others: Bruce Winick's 1985 piece in the UCLA Law Review,2 and
the 1993 article by Grant Morris and J. Reid Meloy in the U.C. Davis
Law Review. 3 1 tell my audiences that I say this not because they are
first-rate analytical and doctrinal pieces of scholarship (which they
are), but because, empirically, they force us to confront the glaring
1 For a sampling of my writings on this topic, see, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Beyond Dusky and
Godinez: Competency Before and After Trial, 21 BEHAV. ScL & L. 297 (2003); Michael L. Per-
lin, "For the Misdemeanor Outlaw": The Impact of the ADA on the Institutionalization of Crimi-
nal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193 (2000) [hereinafter Perlin,
Outlaw]; Michael L. Perlin, "Dignity Was the First to Leave": Godinez v. Moran, Colin Fergu-
son, and the Trial of Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendants, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 61 (1996)
[hereinafter Perlin, Dignity]; Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of
Competency, 47 U. MIAmI L. REV. 625 (1993) [hereinafter Perlin, Pretexts]; Michael L. Perlin,
Are Courts Competent to Decide Questions of Competency? Stripping the Facade From United
States v. Charters, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 957 (1990) [hereinafter Perlin, Charters]; Michael L.
Perlin & Joel Dvoskin, AIDS-Related Dementia and Competency to Stand Trial: A Potential
Abuse of the Forensic Mental Health System, 18 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCIATRY L. 349 (1990).
See generally 4 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABnrY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, ch. 8 (2d
ed. 2002) [hereinafter 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW].
2 Bruce Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REV. 921 (1985).
3 Grant H. Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The Uncivil Commitment of
Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1 (1993).
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pretextuality4 that is at the heart of incompetency-to-stand-trial
(IST) law: the fact that decades after the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Jackson v. Indiana-holding that an incompetent-
to-stand-trial criminal defendant cannot be housed indefinitely in a
maximum security forensic facility because of incompetent status
unless it appears likely that he or she will regain competence to
stand trial within the "foreseeable future" 5-nearly half of the states
still have not implemented, enforced or operationalized Jackson.
6
And I further tell my audiences that that failure-a failure unthink-
able in other areas of constitutional law 7-- better than any other ex-
ample, demonstrates the fraud and charade of mental disability
law.8
In the decade since Morris and Meloy published their U.C. Da-
vis article, nothing has been written that has led me to reconsider
my position.9 Until now. Flatly stated, the article published in this
Symposium by Grant Morris and his co-authors (sometimes "the
Morris article") is the most important piece about incompetency-to-
stand-trial law ever published, and it may very well be the most
important empirical piece ever published about any aspect of foren-
4 See Michael L. Perlin, "Life Is In Mirrors, Death Disappears": Giving Life to Atkins, 33 N.M. L.
REV. 315, 343-44 (2003) [hereinafter Perlin, Mirrors]. "Pretextuality" means that courts ac-
cept (either implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishon-
est (frequently meretricious) decision-making, specifically where witnesses, especially
expert witnesses, show a "high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order to
achieve desired ends." Id.; see also Perlin, Outlaw, supra note 1, at 227; Michael L. Perlin, A
Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 422-23 (2000) [hereinafter Perlin, Healing]. I first
developed these thoughts in Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and
Law: Of "Ordinary Common Sense," Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 133-35 (1991) [hereinafter Perlin, Morality and
Pretextuality].
5 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
6 Winick, supra note 2, at 940-41; Morris & Meloy, supra note 3, at 9; see Michael L. Perlin,
"'Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth:": Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disa-
bility Law Developed As It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 23-24 (1999) [hereinafter Per-
lin, Half-Wracked]; Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of
Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39, 48 (1992).
7 Imagine if half the states simply chose to ignore the Supreme Court's decisions in areas
such as reproductive rights law, school desegregation, or environmental protection; what
sort of public outcry would follow such failures of implementation.
8 See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL
(2000) [hereinafter PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE].
9 This is certainly not to say that that there has been no superb scholarship in this area of the
law. See, e.g., 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 8A-2.2, at 11-12 n.57 (citing
recent "significant" literature). However, I believe that none of this scholarship-no matter
its intellectual rigor, empirical grounding, or theoretical brilliance-can match for impor-
tance the articles by Winick or by Morris and Meloy, of which I speak here.
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sic mental disability law. If there is any rationality in the world, its
publication will restructure for all time the debate and the dialogue
about expert testimony by forensic mental health professionals in
criminal law cases.
Morris and his colleagues show us that all our assumptions
about forensic testimony-in what had always appeared to be a rel-
atively "easy" area of mental disability law (competency-to-stand-
trial determinations)-have been dead wrong. These authors force
us to do what scholars, advocates, polemicists and politicians have
failed at miserably for the past thirty years-they force us to recon-
ceptualize the role of the expert in the decision making process in
what is probably the most important law/mental health profes-
sional interaction in the criminal law field: the adjudication of in-
competency-to-stand-trial (IST) cases. This is not just "news"; this is
big news. And it is news that no one could have possibly expected.
It is groundbreaking, it is revolutionary, and it is profound. Mental
disability law will never (or, at least, should never) be the same.
The reader of this essay at this point is logically entitled to ask:
Why? What's the big deal? What is it about this seemingly straight-
forward and direct article, reporting on paper responses to a multi-
ple-vignette test, that can cause such effusive hyperbole? 0 And this
is a fair question. I say what I have said for multiple reasons (as I
will explore below), but primarily for an overarching one.
This article forces us to acknowledge that the disagreement
among experts-and the most "expert" experts, at that1 -is
profound and pervasive, so much so that it is perhaps time to dust
off the phrase made famous nearly thirty years ago by Bruce Ennis
and Tom Litwack, discussing clinical predictions of future danger-
ousness in the context of civil commitment; that this exercise is no
more than "flipping coins in the courtroom."' 2
10 Although Professors Morris and Haroun are friends of mine, I never met the third collabo-
rator until after I submitted this paper. Be assured that these connections have no impact
on what I am writing here.
11 The authors sent their questionnaire solely to individuals who were either Board Certified
in Forensic Psychiatry or Diplomates in Forensic Psychology. See Grant Morris et al., Com-
petency to Stand Trial on Trial, 4 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 193, 212 (2004).
12 Bruce Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins
in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REv. 693 (1974).
There is some irony here, to be sure, in that researchers and clinicians have finally broken
the 50% barrier (as reflected in the Ennis and Litwack article). For the most comprehensive
research on predictions of violence, see John Monahan, Clinical and Actuarial Predictions of
Violence, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
§§ 7-2.0 to 7-2.4, at 300 (David Faigman et al. eds., 1997).
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The implications of this insight reverberate throughout the en-
tire criminal trial process, and will, eventually, force us to rethink
the role of expertise in sexually violent predator determinations, 13 in
insanity defense cases,14 in sentencing matters,15 and in death pen-
alty inquiries.16 These, though, are inquiries for a future day. At this
point in time, we must focus on the matter at hand. If the odds of
obtaining these results were less than one in a billion,17 what does
that say about the role of this evaluation in the criminal law system
(and, most importantly, what does it say about the ultimate disposi-
tion of tens of thousands of felony cases a year in which there is an
inquiry as to the defendant's competency)? 8 The genie, to use a
shopworn clich6, is out of the bottle. It cannot be put back.
This article will proceed in the following manner. First, I will
look at the Morris article's main findings, and explain why it is so
precedent-shaking for all of forensic criminal law, and why it dem-
onstrates, beyond any doubt, the pretextuality of this entire area of
the law (something I have been seeking to do for a decade).19 Sec-
ond, I will focus on a cluster of points made in the article, and
demonstrate how these points reflect the pretextuality to which I
have just referred, and how they require us to rethink so many of
the basic assumptions generally held about this area of the law.
Third, I will focus on another cluster of points made in the article,
and demonstrate how those points reflect the sanism that is perva-
sive in all of mental disability law.20 Finally, I will offer some mod-
13 On the (unproven) assumption that evaluators have this expertise, see David Shapiro, Eth-
ical Dilemmas for the Mental Health Professional: Issues Raised by Recent Supreme Court Deci-
sions, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 177, 199-200 (1997).
14 See, e.g, Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You from Me": The Insanity De-
fense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L.
REV. 1375, 1408 (1997) [hereinafter Perlin, Borderline] (one myth associated with the insanity
defense is "[a] fear that the soft, exculpatory sciences of psychiatry and psychology, claim-
ing expertise in almost all areas of behavior, will somehow overwhelm the criminal justice
system by thwarting the system's crime control component").
15 See, e.g., Richard E. Redding & Lynda E. Frost, Adjudicative Competence in the Modern Juve-
nile Court, 9 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 353 (2001).
16 See, e.g., Kenneth B. Dekleva, Psychiatric Expertise in the Sentencing Phase of Capital Murder
Cases, 29 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 58, 58 (2001).
17 Morris & Meloy, supra note 3, at 52.
18 See 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 8A-2.1, at 3 n. 5 (citing HENRY J.
STEADMAN, BEATINC A RAP? DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL 4 (1979)
and noting that 36,000 potentially incompetent defendants are evaluated yearly).
19 See generally Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 1.
20 See, e.g., Perlin, Mirrors, supra note 4, at 317 n.28. "Sanism" is an irrational prejudice to-
wards mentally ill persons, which is of the same quality and character as other irrational
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est conclusions that we can draw from the publication of this new
data.
My title comes from Bob Dylan's towering masterpiece, Idiot
Wind,21 a song whose "searing metaphors and savage language"
22
create-to my mind-a perfect milieu for mental disability law
analyses. The line in question is part of this angry verse:
It was gravity which pulled us down and destiny which broke us
apart[.]
You tamed the lion in my cage but it just wasn't enough to change
my heart.
Now everything's a little upside down, as a matter of fact the
wheels have stopped[.]
What's good is bad, what's bad is good, you'll find out when you
reach the top[.]
You're on the bottom.
23
As I hope to demonstrate in this article, the world of incompe-
tency-to-stand-trial law is truly "upside down," and, in many im-
portant ways, the "wheels [of justice] have stopped." I hope that the
publication and dissemination of this symposium issue will be the
first step in the taming of this "idiot wind."
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FINDINGS
Morris and his colleagues report that, in assessing Vignette 1,
the 264 forensic psychiatrists and psychologists were evenly di-
vided,24 and characterize that division as "not merely surprising,
[but] shocking."2-5 This is an understatement: It is stupefying. It is
prejudices, and is based largely upon stereotype, myth, superstition and deindividualiza-
tion. Id.
21 Bob Dylan, Idiot Wind, on BLOOD ON THE TRACKS (Ram's Horn Music 1975) available at
http://www.bobdylan.com/songs/idiot.html (last visited July 28, 2004) [hereinafter Idiot
Wind].
This is the fourth time that I have turned to that song as inspiration for the title of an
article on mental disability law. See Perlin, Borderline, supra note 14, at 1379-80; Michael L.
Perlin, The Americans with Disabilities Act: "What's Good Is Bad, What's Bad Is Good, You'll
Find Out When You Reach the Top, You're on the Bottom": Are the Americans with Disabilities
Act (and Olmstead v. L.C.) Anything More than "Idiot Wind"?, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 235,
241 (2001-02) [hereinafter Perlin, Olmstead]; Michael L. Perlin, "Big Ideas, Images and Dis-
torted Facts": The Insanity Defense, Genetics, and the "Political World," in GENETICS AND CiMI-
NALITY: THE POTENTIAL MISUSE OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION IN COURT 37, 39 (Jeffrey Botkin,
et al., eds. 1999).
22 Perlin, Olmstead, supra note 21, at 241.
23 Idiot Wind, supra note 21.
24 
Morris et al., supra note 11, at 215.
25 Id.
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also not random. The authors calculate the chances of this split as
being less than one in one billion.26 This is equally stupefying.
27
The authors logically conclude from the data that "the defen-
dant's fate depends only on who performed the evaluation. '28 And,
indeed, no other conclusion can reasonably be drawn from these
facts, facts which lead the authors to ask-somewhat ruefully, I
think-"are forensic psychiatrists and forensic psychologists compe-
tent to assess competence?" 29 What is the significance of these as-
tounding findings? Let me suggest a few possibilities:
1. We have always accepted as conventional wisdom the fact
there is high inter-rater concordance in the assessment of what
should be a much more difficult evaluation: whether a defendant is
insane (meaning, is he not responsible for his acts because of mental
illness which led him to, variously, not know right from wrong, or
be able to appreciate the nature or quality of his act).3° It would be
reasonable to expect greater ambiguity on insanity questions be-
cause of several factors: (a) the ambiguity of the tests, (b) the politi-
cal context of insanity defense evaluations, (c) the greater publicity
attached to these cases, and (d) the ultimate implications of the ulti-
mate finding.31 Yet most studies have demonstrated unfailingly that
the rate of agreement in these cases is remarkably high-often ap-
proaching 90%.32 The contrast is startling.
2. The competency-to-stand-trial test is often seen as an "easy"
or "minimalist" one.33 Only, it is commonly argued, the most "out of
it" criminal defendants will be found IST, in large part because the
26 Id. at 216.
27 
Only one of 273 respondents adequately explained why the Vignette #1 defendant might
be competent under the "rational manner" language but incompetent under the "rational
understanding" standard. Id. at 225.
28 Id. at 216.
29 Id. Cf. Perlin, Charters, supra note 1 (asking the same question about judges).
3o For a discussion of all insanity tests, see 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABLIITY LAW, supra note 1,
§§ 9A-3 to 9A-3.7, at 145-79.
31 See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1994) [here-
inafter PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE].
32 Perlin, Half-Wracked, supra note 6, at 21 n.96 (citing, inter alia, Jeffrey L. Rogers et al., In-
sanity Defense: Contested or Conceded?, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 885 (1984); Kenneth K.
Fukunaga et al., Insanity Plea: Interexaminer Agreement and Concordance of Psychiatric Opin-
ion and Court Verdict, 5 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 325, 326 (1981)).
33 See Martin Sabelli & Stacey Leyton, Train Wrecks and Freeway Crashes: An Argument For
Fairness And Against Self Representation in the Criminal Justice System, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 161, 171 (2000).
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competency test demands so little. What then to do with the utterly
contrary findings in this survey?
3. In the years since Bernard Diamond exposed the fallacy of
the "impartial expert," scholars, for the most part have avoided the
"dirty little question" that was at the core of Diamond's writings in
this area: Is there such a thing as a "neutral" or "objective" expert
witness? I have always thought that this was a vastly under-dis-
cussed question, and perhaps, this article will reinvigorate that
debate. 4
We ignore the results reported here at our own peril. They tell
us that all of our common wisdom about these evaluations is, to be
blunt, dead wrong. We can no longer keep our heads conveniently
and blissfully buried in the legal, moral and behavioral sands.
II. PRETEXTUALITY AND CRIMINAL INCOMPETENCY LAW
Morris and his colleagues' findings also demonstrate the
depths of the pretextuality of the criminal incompetency system.
Over a decade ago, I wrote this about the pretexts of that system,
under the guise of "morality," as expert witnesses seek to achieve
the "right" ends:
"Morality" issues affect the incompetency to stand trial process in
several critical ways. First, the process is subject to significant polit-
ical bias. Second, the power imbalance issues that taint the entire
forensic process are especially potent. Third, the fact that the inade-
quacy of pre-trial evaluations, cursory testimony, the misuse and
misapplication of substantive standards, and the non-implementa-
tion of Supreme Court constitutional directives receive little judicial
34 Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 1, at 641 (discussing, inter alia, Bernard L. Diamond, The Fallacy
of the Impartial Expert, 3 ARCHIVES CRIm. PSYCHODYNAMIcs 221, 223 (1959)). I wrote this a
decade ago:
I begin with the proposition that the phrase "neutral expert" is an oxymoron.
Bernard Diamond, for one, believed that a witness' unconscious identification
with a "side" of a legal battle or his more conscious identification with a value
system or ideological leanings may lead to "innumerable subtle distortions and
biases in his testimony that spring from this wish to triumph." Even demurring
to Diamond's psychoanalytic speculations, subsequent behavioral research dem-
onstrates that the expert's opinion in insanity defense cases and civil psychic
trauma trials positively correlates with the expert's underlying political ideology.
Id. Diamond's article has been virtually ignored since that time. But see Daniel W. Shu-
man, et al., Assessing the Believability of Expert Witnesses: Science in the Jurybox, 37
JURIMETRICS J. 23, 25 n.10 (1996); Daniel W. Shuman, et al., An Empirical Examination of the
Use of Expert Witnesses in the Courts-Part II: A Three City Study, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 194, 195
n.7 (1994) (both citing Diamond's article).
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or scholarly attention suggests that specific social ends animate the
entire incompetency to stand trial system.
35
What light does the Morris study shed on these issues?
The Morris article reveals the extent to which pretextuality
dominates the incompetency-to-stand-trial system. First, the entire
system-implicitly and explicitly-assumes that the defendant com-
mitted the predicate criminal act with which he is charged.36 Al-
though there is nothing in the invocation of the incompetency status
that at all concedes factual guilt (as opposed to the entry of a not-
guilty-by-reason-of-insanity plea that concedes the commission of
the underlying criminal act), 37 it is assumed by all that the defen-
dant did, in fact, commit the crime.
When I was a public defender, I represented in individual
cases well over 200 criminal defendants who had been found-at
some point-incompetent to stand trial. In not a single case did the
prosecutor, the judge, or the forensic evaluator even acknowledge
the possibility that the defendant might have been "factually inno-
cent" of the underlying charge. This is a topic that is rarely, if ever,
addressed in the case law or the legal or behavioral literature, but I
am convinced that it is one that must be taken seriously if we are
going to carefully and comprehensively examine this question.
38
In fact, the research shows that "expert" evaluations frequently
rely not on the examiners' experience or knowledge but on the facts
of the criminal act charged.39 In one study, the "only variable" that
distinguished those determined to be dangerous from those deter-
mined not to be dangerous was the alleged crime: "The more seri-
ous the alleged crime, the more likely that the psychiatrist would
find the defendant dangerous."'4
35 Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 1, at 653; see Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, supra note 4.
36 See Morris et al., supra note 11, at 194-96.
37 See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363 (1983) ("A verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that constitutes a crimi-
nal offense, and (ii) he committed the act because of mental illness.").
3 See Perlin, Outlaw, supra note 1, at 206-07.
Consider this easy hypothetical. A defendant is charged with crime and is, in fact, factu-
ally innocent. Walking to the courthouse for the initial bail hearing, he is hit on the head
by a cinder block from ongoing courthouse construction, causing severe organic brain
damage. He will be found-most likely-incompetent to stand trial, but such finding in
no way should allow us to assume that he is factually "guilty" of the underlying charge.
39 Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 1, at 663.
40 Id. (quoting Joseph J. Cocozza & Henry J. Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of
Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERs L. REV. 1084, 1096 (1976)).
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Second, the paper notes the Supreme Court's fact-not-in-evi-
dence assumption that, in competency-to-stand-trial determina-
tions, defense counsel "will often have the best-informed view of the
defendant's ability to participate in his defense,"41 and then ob-
serves that counsel "typically does not testify in the incompetency
hearing. '42 The empirical data is even more dramatic than that. In a
recent paper, Professor Randy Otto and his colleagues reported on
data that revealed that, in a study of 674 juvenile incompetency
cases (the subset where one might reasonably expect counsel would
be more involved than in other cases), not a single defense counsel
testified at the juvenile's competency hearing.43 This pretext is just
as glaring.
Third, the analysis of Vignette # 1 demonstrates that many fo-
rensic witnesses insist on "playing lawyer," making decisions as to
incompetency based on their perceptions of whether a defendant's
tactical decision (e.g., to refuse to raise an insanity defense) is a ra-
tional one.44 There are many valid reasons why a defendant would
want to reject an insanity defense (not the least of which is the likeli-
hood that he would be incarcerated in a maximum security facility
for a far greater time period following a successful insanity plea
than had he been sentenced to the maximum term allowable under
the criminal law).45 For the forensic expert to make these conclu-
sions reflects both inappropriate and pretextual behavior.
41 Morris et al., supra note 11, at 199 (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 450 (1992)).
42Id.
43 Randy Otto, "Evaluations of Juveniles' Competence to Proceed," paper presented to the
American Academy of Psychiatry and Law, Newport Beach, Cal., October 24, 2002; see also
Annette Christy et al., Juveniles Evaluated Incompetent to Proceed: Characteristics and Quality
of Mental Health Professionals' Evaluation, 35 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAc. 380 (2004) (of the
1357 evaluations generated in the 674 cases, only thirty-three reported on an interview by
the examining psychologist of the juvenile's lawyer).
44 Morris et al., supra note 11, at 220.
45 See Jones, 463 U.S. at 369 ("There simply is no necessary correlation between severity of the
offense and length of time necessary for recovery. The length of the acquittee's hypotheti-
cal criminal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of his commitment."). This is
especially significant in a case such as the one in the vignette where the maximum sen-
tence the defendant would face would be a year in the county jail. See Morris et al., supra
note 11, at 213, 219.
The research demonstrates that, in the case of misdemeanors and lesser felonies, defend-
ants who "successfully" plead insanity generally serve nine times as long in a maximum
security facility than they would have served had they been convicted. See Perlin, Outlaw,
supra note 1, at 210; PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE, supra note 31, at 110-11; HENRY J.
STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATING INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM
58-61 (1993).
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Fourth, the responses reveal an inappropriate fusing on the
part of some of the experts between their evaluative role and their
(non-existent) treating role. 46 One respondent thus answered: "She
[the subject of the vignette] appears to need medication. I would
lean toward unfit with greater period of observation as an inpa-
tient."47 The inappropriateness of this sort of response was first
noted over thirty years ago,48 and remarkably, it still appears to be
flourishing. Again, it is the rankest sort of pretext to invoke or adapt
the competency evaluation process to serve as a vehicle for treat-
ment needs.
Fifth, some of the responders simply rejected the significance
of the difference between the two incompetency tests used in the
study; "I'm not impressed with the standards ... really being differ-
ent," wrote one.49 Again, there is nothing new here:
[Affter considering Ontario's amended mental health law aimed at
making involuntary civil commitment standards more stringent, a
prominent local psychiatrist argued that the new law had little em-
pirical weight: "Doctors will continue to certify those whom they
really believe should be certified; they will merely learn a new
language."
50
What is depressing is that this behavior continues, unabated, after
more than twenty years.
Sixth, the article reveals that, in spite of the impressive array of
new competency assessment instruments now available to evalu-
ators, "the overwhelming majority of psychiatrists and psycholo-
gists do not use psychological tests in assessing a defendant's
competency. '51 This refusal to use such tools (e.g., the MacArthur
On the right of a defendant to refuse to plead the insanity defense, see 4 PERLIN, MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 9A-8, at 241-45.
46 Morris et al., supra note 11, at 222-23.
47 Id. at 222.
48 See ARTHUR MATTHEWS, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 134 (1970) (noting the
competency process is frequently invoked to effect hospitalization that might not other-
wise be possible under the state's civil commitment statute); see also Winick, supra note 2,
at 933.
49 Morris et al., supra note 11, at 224.
50 Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 1, at 645 (quoting William 0. McCormick, Involuntary Commit-
ment in Ontario: Some Barriers to the Provision of Proper Care, 124 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 715, 717
(1981)).
51 Morris et al., supra note 11, at 234 (relying, inter alia, upon Randy Borum & Thomas Grisso,
Psychological Test Use in Criminal Forensic Evaluations, 26 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RES. & PRAC.
465, 468 (1995) (11% of psychiatrists and 36% of psychologists regularly used such tests)).
For some perspective, consider that this test has only been referred to in two unpublished
cases. See Anderson v. State, No. 04-00-00751-CR, 2002 WL 31556954 (Tex. App. 2002);
Commonwealth v. Morasse, No. 1999-01420, 2001 WL 1566407 (Mass. Super. 2001).
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Competence Assessment Tool-Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-
CA))5 2 reflects, again, a pretextual turn on the part of experts who
presumably feel that their expertise enables them to make such de-
terminations without the assistance of "standardized and nationally
norm-referenced clinical measure[s].
5 3
Finally, the respondents consistently failed'to differentiate be-
tween forensic and clinical issues,54 and it is this error that in many
ways best demonstrates the pretextuality that is at play here. The
answers of "numerous" respondents "clearly suggested" that clinical
questions concerning the presence of mental illness, psychosis and
amenability to treatment were determinative of their final (puta-
tively)forensic conclusion.55 The overt-perhaps defiant-call on the
part of the respondents to willfully ignore the legal standard and to
superimpose their own moralistic sense of how the case should be
resolved tells us that this pretextual system is far more corrupt than
any of us had known.
Writing some 14 years ago, Michael Saks charged that expert
witnesses often act like "imperial experts" who install themselves as
"temporary monarch[s]" by replacing a "social preference expressed
through the law and legal process with [their] own preferences."
' '
Saks based his conclusion on court hearings that he watched in one
courthouse.5 7 The cohort of responders to the Morris survey-from
across the nation 5 8 -clarifies that this is not, had anyone so thought
it to be, simply an idiosyncratic or local problem.
One evaluator, in responding to the vignettes, answered in this
manner: "Irrespective of the specific legal definition of incompe-
tency, in this case the defendant is incompetent based on active psy-
chosis that impairs his reasoning ability and judgment."59 Over
thirty years ago, Professors Robert A. Burt and Norval Morris set
52 See, e.g., THOMAS GRSSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESMENTS AND INSTRU-
MENTS 97 (2d ed. 2003).
53 Morris et al., supra note 11, at 233 (quoting Patricia Zapf & Jodi Viljoen, Issues and Consider-
ations Regarding the Use of Assessment Instruments in the Evaluation of Competency to Stand
Trial, 21 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 351, 359 (2003)).
54 Id. at 237.
5 Id; see also Christy et al., supra note 43 (calling on examiners to understand the difference
between forensic and therapeutic assessments).
56 Michael J. Saks, Expert Witnesses, Nonexpert Witnesses, and Nonwitness Experts, 14 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 291, 294 (1990).
57 Id. at 293.
m See Morris et al., supra note 11, at 212.
59 Id. at 237-38.
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out the paradigmatic incompetency-to-stand-trial testimonial
dialogue:
Judge: Doctor, is he incompetent?
Psychiatrist: Your Honor, he is psychotic!
60
When I first wrote about this dialogue, I said this:
This is intuitively bad diagnosis, bad forensic testimony, and bad
law. Yet it continues regularly. First, and perhaps foremost, it meets
judicial needs. Judges are primarily concerned that incompetency
assessments conform to minimal legal requirements. Accordingly,
they are likely to require only that the evaluation "offer no less than
what the judge has become accustomed to in past assessments."
This attitude produces disincentive for new methods that might en-
gender uncertainty, the low card in any heuristic judge's hand.
61
Apparently, nothing has changed in thirty-plus years.
III. SANISM AND CRIMINAL INCOMPETENCY LAW
In a 2000 law review article, I had this to say about sanism and
criminal incompetency law:
Sanism similarly infects incompetency-to-stand-trial jurisprudence
in at least four critical ways: (1) courts resolutely adhere to the con-
viction that defendants regularly malinger and feign incompetency;
(2) courts stubbornly refuse to understand the distinction between
incompetency to stand trial and insanity, even though the two sta-
tuses involve different concepts, different standards, and different
points on the "time line"; (3) courts misunderstand the relationship
between incompetency and subsequent commitment, and fail to
consider the lack of a necessary connection between post-determi-
nation institutionalization and appropriate treatment; and (4)
courts regularly accept patently inadequate expert testimony in in-
competency to stand trial cases.
62
If there is any better evidence than the Morris article to support
the fourth of these assertions, I frankly cannot imagine what that
might be. The Morris article-in its reportage on the responses and
elsewhere-highlights other evidence of rampant sanism in the en-
tire incompetency determination process. Initially, the authors note,
60 Robert A. Burt & Norval Morris, A Proposalfor the Abolition of the Insanity Plea, 40 U. CHI. L.
REV. 66, 92 n.109 (1972).
61 Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 1, at 657.
62 Perlin, Outlaw, supra note 1, at 235-36; see also Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 1, at 678 (discuss-
ing, inter alia, Hensley v. State (575 N.E.2d 1053, 1055 (Ind. App. Ct. 1991) (no abuse of
discretion on the issue of incompetency to stand trial where the defendant was able to
deny the crime and name the alleged victim, despite the uncontested fact that the defen-
dant's "testimony and actions at the competency hearing were not generally meaningful";
State v. Pruitt, 480 N.E.2d 499, 504 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (sole expert witness testified in
conclusory terms that the defendant "suffered no mental disease or defect [and] under-
stood the respective roles of the cast of characters at the trial, and the nature of the charges
against him," yet "never indicated ... what the defendant actually understood").
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"trial judges appear to have little interest in carefully weighing all
the evidence, and in making their own independent assessment of
the defendant's competence. '63 Why? Why do judges agree with the
forensic evaluator in 90% or 96.3% or 99.7%(!) of the cases studied?
64
This failure to make independent assessments in this area of law
reflects the bleakest sort of sanism. Judge Bazelon's words of years
ago still ring true:
Very few judges are psychiatrists. But equally few are economists,
aeronautical engineers, atomic scientists, or marine biologists. For
some reason, however, many people seem to accept judicial scru-
tiny of, say, the effect of a proposed dam on fish life, while they
reject similar scrutiny of the effect of psychiatric treatment on
human lives. [I]t can hardly be that we are more concerned for the
salmon than the schizophrenic.
6s
This unprecedented-in-any-other-area-of-the-law abdication of
judicial responsibility helps to define sanism.66
The finding of competence is not trivial, nor is it a "legal tech-
nicality" (if that beleaguered word has any place at all in discussions
of constitutional law and policy).67 It is, rather, the bedrock of a legal
system purportedly, at least in part, premised upon the dignity of
the individual,68 and one which allows the punishment of only indi-
viduals who can comprehend the significance of that punishment. 69
For judges to say, as Professor Zapf has reported, that it would
make their job "much easier" if experts would "simply state whether
63 Morris et al., supra note 11, at 199.
64 See id. at 199-200 nn.28, 30 (citing RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO
STAND TRIAL (1980) (90%); Steven Hart & Robert Hare, Predicting Fitness to Stand Trial: The
Relative Power of Demographic, Criminal and Clinical Variables, 4 FORENSIC REP. 53 (1992)
(96.3%); and Patricia A. Zapf et al., Have the Courts Abdicated Their Responsibility for Determi-
nation of Competency to Stand Trial to Clinicians?, 4 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAc. 27, 39 (2004)
(99.7%).
65 David L. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CI. L. REV. 742, 743 (1969),
quoted in Henry Dlugacz, Riggins v. Nevada: Towards a Unified Standard for a Prisoner's
Right to Refuse Medication?, 17 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 41, 79 (1993).
66 On sanist judges in general, see PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 8, at 51-55; see also
id. at 47 ("Judges 'are embedded in the cultural presuppositions that engulf us all' ") (quot-
ing Anthony D'Amato, Harmful Speech and the Culture of Indeterminacy, 32 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 329, 332 (1991)).
67 See Robert J. Boeckmann & Tom Tyler, Commonsense Justice and Inclusion Within the Moral
Community: When Do People Receive Procedural Protections from Others?, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 362, 363 (1997) (discussing public perceptions of insanity defense as such a
"technicality").
68 See generally Perlin, Dignity, supra note 1.
69 See Perlin, Mirrors, supra note 4, at 326-47 (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in
Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002) (barring execution of persons with mental
retardation)).
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the defendant is competent or not 70 is, to repeat a word I have al-
ready used here, stupefying.
As Morris and his colleagues underscore: "[Tihe competency
adjudication process has not been taken seriously, either by prose-
cutors or defense counsel who raise the issue of competence and
introduce evidence on this issue, or by judges who supposedly con-
sider that evidence and make their decisions."'71 This trivialization-
premised implicitly on the assumption that the people about whom
these decisions are made are somehow not "worthy" of true consti-
tutional protection (and are, perhaps, less than human)72-is the rot-
ten core of sanism. 7z
The abdication on the part of lawyers (leaving it to mental
health professionals to develop their own competence assessment
standards with little assistance)74 and on the part of judges (refusing
to independently assess clinical testimony),75 the failure of most cli-
nicians to use standardized and validated tests, 76 the lack of mean-
ingful dialogue between the lawyer and the evaluator, 77 are all
symptoms of the same malignancy: the corrosive impact of sanism
on the legal process.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is rare for a law review article to force us to significantly
change the way that we construct an area of the law. The lead article
in this symposium does that by exposing the fraudulence of the in-
70 Zapf, supra note 64, at 35.
71 Morris et al., supra note 11, at 227.
72 Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 394 (1992) (discussing sanist myth
that "mentally ill individuals are 'different,' and, perhaps, less than human"); Michael L.
Perlin, Where The Winds Hit Heavy on The Borderline": Mental Disability Law, Theory And
Practice, "Us" And "Them," 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 775, 785 (1998).
73 On sanism's "malignant," "corrosive," "pernicious," and "pervasive" impact on mental
disability law, see Michael L. Perlin, "She Breaks Just like a Little Girl": Neonaticide, the In-
sanity Defense, and the Irrelevance of "Ordinary Common Sense," 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 1, 6, 24 n.188 (2003) [hereinafter Perlin, Neonaticide]; Michael L. Perlin, "You Have Dis-
cussed Lepers and Crooks": Sanism in Clinical Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 685, 687 n.15
(2003); Perlin, Healing, supra note 4, at 419; Perlin, Mirrors, supra note 4, at 348.
74 Morris et al., supra note 11, at 235-36.
75 Id. at 235.
76 See id. at 234, 237-38.
77 Id. at 235-36.
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competency evaluation process, and by demonstrating that our "or-
dinary common sense"78 is gravely distorted and deeply flawed.
These astonishing revelations underscore the conclusion that
the mental disability law system is a pretextual and sanist one, and
force us to consider the implications of this teaching. If we now
know that clinical decision-making is as random and incoherent as
it appears to be, and that the courts wish to abdicate their role even
more completely, what does that say about the way we continue to
carry on business-as-usual in this area? At what point will we fi-
nally acknowledge that this system is completely damaged and in
need of a complete rebuilding and reconceptualization?
Everything here, to return to the lyric used in my title, is more
than "a little upside down." And although the "wheels" (of justice)
have not "stopped," the authentic administration of justice has. In
the next verse of Idiot Wind, the song from which the lyric comes,
Dylan sings, "I noticed at the ceremony, your corrupt ways had fi-
nally made you blind."79 Perhaps the publication of this remarkable
article will finally open our eyes.
78 'Ordinary common sense" refers to a self-referential and non-reflective way of construct-
ing the world ("I see it that way, therefore everyone sees it that way; I see it that way,
therefore that's the way it is"). See, e.g., Perlin, Neonaticide, supra note 73, at 8; PERLIN,
HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 8, at 16-20; see also Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the
Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REv. 3 (1990);
PERLIN, INSANrrY DEFENSE, supra note 31, at 287-310.
79 Idiot Wind, supra note 21.

